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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
CIVIL PROCEDURE-THE AVAILABILITY OF RELIEF FROM A FINAL
JUDGMENT FOR REASON OF JUDICIAL MISTAKE OF LAW UNDER
RULE 60(b)(1) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-
Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Century Casualty Co., 621 F.2d
1062 (10th Cir. 1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
The availability of relief from a final judgment for reason of judi-
cial mistake of law under rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure' currently receives three different views among the circuit
courts of appeal.2 The Tenth Circuit recently had an opportunity in
1. Rule 60(b) states:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), mis-
representation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judg-
ment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and
for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceed-
ing was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding,
or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28,
U.S.C., § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram
nobis, corum vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of
review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall
be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
2. The most conservative view simply does not recognize rule 60(b)(1) as a means of ob-
taining relief from a final judgment for reason of judicial mistake. Under this view, relief from a
mistake of law by the court is available only through a rule 59(e) motion to amend a judgment or
by way of timely appeal. This view is articulated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Swam v. United States, 327 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1964), where in discussing the plaintiffs allegations
of judicial mistake of law as ground for its rule 60(b)(1) motion the court said:
These averments do not constitute the kind of mistake or inadvertence that comes within
the ambit of rule 60(b). If plaintiff believed the district court was mistaken as a matter of
law in dismissing the original complaint, he should have appealed within sixty days after
the dismissal or he might have filed a timely motion under rule 59 to vacate the judg-
ment of dismissal and for leave to amend his complaint.
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Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Century Casualty Co. ,3 to further estab-
lish its interpretation of rule 60(b)(1). 4
In Security Mutual, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Colorado had been directed by the Tenth Circuit to determine
the amount of Security Mutual's liability to Century in accordance with
the terms of the reinsurance agreement between the parties.5 Instead,
the district court entered judgment in favor of Century but mistakenly
dismissed the action without determining the amount of Security Mu-
tual's liability to Century.6 One hundred and five days after the judg-
ment was entered Century filed a rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief.
The district court applied the conservative view of rule 60(b)(1),
joining those jurisdictions whose definition of "mistake" does not in-
clude judicial mistake for purposes of the rule.' The conservative view
maintains that, other than through appeal, only a rule 59(e) motion to
Id. at 433. Accord, Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266, 1268 (1st Cir. 1971).
A more moderate view of rule 60(b)(l) allows the court to relieve a party from a final judg-
ment upon a motion made before the time for appeal, has expired. This appeal time limitation is
designed to prevent the use of rule 60(b)(1) as a substitute for timely appeal or as an extention of
the effective time for review of a judicial error. This moderate view of rule 60(b)(1) is advocated
by Professor Moore: "[Wihy should not the trial court have the power to correct its own judicial
error under 60(b)(1) within a reasonable time-which as we subsequently point out, should not
exceed the time for appeal. . . ?" 7 J. MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.22 [3], at 259-60 (2d ed.
1979). The majority of federal jurisdictions, including the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth,
Ninth and D.C. Circuits, employ the moderate view to some degree. Compare Fox v. Brewer, 620
F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1980) (relief available from an inadvertent judicial mistake upon a motion
made within the time for appeal) with International Controls v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 670 (2d Cir.
1977) (relief available from a substantive mistake by the court upon a motion made prior to the
expiration of the time for appeal).
The Fifth Circuit applies a liberal view of rule 60(b)(1), allowing relief from a final judgment
for a substantive or fundamental misconception of law upon a motion made within a reasonable
time.
We think that neither the rule itself nor our decisions inflexibly required that in this case
the Rule 60 motion raising a post-judgment change in decisional law had to be filed
before the time allowable for appeal had run. . . . It [rule 60(b)] makes no mention of
the period for noticing appeal or of whether notice of appeal has been filed. Instead it
sets up an outside time limit of one year. . . and prescribes a "reasonable time" stan-
dard which by its nature invites flexible application in varying situations.
Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1976).
3. 621 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1980).
4. The Tenth Circuit had previously rejected the conservative view of rule 60(b)(1), in
Rocky Mountain Tool & Machine Co. v. Tecon, 371 F.2d 589, 597 (10th Cir. 1966), by refusing to
apply the ten day limitation prescribed in rule 59(e) to a rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief from a
mistake of judicial oversight.
5. 531 F.2d 974, 979 (10th Cir. 1976).
6. "[C]onstruing the mandates as barring a hearing to determine Security Mutual's liability
to Century was error." 621 F.2d 1062, 1067 (10th Cir. 1980).
7. The First and Seventh Circuits apply the conservative view of rule 60(b)(l). See note 2
supra .
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amend a judgment8 can be used to correct a mistake of law by the
court.9 Since a rule 59(e) motion must be made within ten days of the
judgment, relief from a judicial mistake under the conservative view is
available only upon motion made within ten days. Therefore, the dis-
trict court considered Century's 60(b)(1) motion as a rule 59(e) motion
to amend the judgment and denied the motion as untimely.' 0
Even if the moderate view of rule 60(b)(1) had been employed,
Century's motion for relief would have been denied as untimely. The
moderate view permits a rule 60(b)(1) motion for judicial mistake."I
Jurisdictions that follow the moderate view allow the trial court to con-
sider a rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief from a judicial oversight beyond
the ten day limitation in rule 59(e). Where the mistake constitutes a
"fundamental misconception of law",'2 however, as opposed to mere
judicial oversight, the motion must be made within the thirty or sixty
day period for timely appeal.' 3 In Security Mutual, the mistake re-
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) provides that: "A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be
served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment."
9. A contrary view, that "mistake" means any type of judicial error, makes relief under
the rule for error of law as extensive as that available under Rule 59(e). . . . [T]he argu-
ment is advanced that a broad construction of "mistake" beneficially extends the ten-day
limit for motions under Rule 59(e). Calling this a benefit loses sight of the complemen-
tary interest in speedy disposition and finality, clearly intended by Rule 59. . . . We see
no purpose for this broad construction of Rule 60(b)(l) overlapping Rule 59(e).
Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266, 1268 (1st Cir. 1971). Accord, Swam v. United States, 327 F.2d
431 (7th Cir. 1964).
10. 621 F.2d at 1067.
!1. Cases illustrative of the moderate view application of rule 60(b)(1) include: Fox v.
Brewer, 620 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1980) (relief available from an inadvertant judicial mistake
upon a motion made within the time for appeal); Compton v. Alton Steamship Co., 608 F.2d 96,
104 (4th Cir. 1979) (relief may be had from a mistake of law by the court if raised within the time
allowed for appeal); International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 670 (2d Cir. 1977) (relief
available from a mistake by the court upon a motion made before the time for appeal has run);
D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 520 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (court may correct a
judicial mistake upon a motion filed within the time for appeal); Gila River Ranch, Inc. v. United
States, 368 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1966) (relief available for a judicial mistake upon a motion
made prior to the expiration of the time for appeal); Sleek v. J.C. Penny Co., 292 F.2d 256, 258 (3d
Cir. 1961) (the court may re-examine its ruling pursuant to rule 60(b) within the period of appeal-
ability); Allen v. Clinchfield R.R., 325 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (E.D. Tenn. 1971) (relief allowed from
a judicial mistake beyond the ten-day limitation of rule 59(e)).
12. "Fundamental misconception of law" is a term that has been used to distinguish an inad-
vertent judicial oversight, such as the omission of damages, from application of incorrect substan-
tive law. It has been suggested that a more lenient time limit be applied to mistakes of judicial
oversight. See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2858 (1973).
13. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) provides in part:
In a civil case in which appeal is permitted by law as of right from a district court to a
court of appeals the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of
the district court within 30 days after the date of entry of judgment or order appealed
from; but if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of
appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after such entry.
3
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sulted from the court's fundamental misconception of law. 14 Under the
moderate view Century's motion would have been timely if made no
later than thirty days after the March 31, entry of judgment.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's liberal
view of rule 60(b)(1). Under the liberal view "mistake" includes judi-
cial errors, and the timeliness of a motion is always determined by ap-
plication of a reasonableness standard with a one year limitation being
the only absolute deadline. This means that the court may relieve a
party from a final judgment for reason of a fundamental judicial error
even if the thirty or sixty day period for timely appeal has expired.' 5
The Tenth Circuit, in considering Century's rule 60(b)(1) motion
after the time for appeal had expired, joins the Fifth Circuit in rejecting
the view of many commentators,' 6 and federal jurisdictions, 7 that al-
lowance of such relief after expiration of the deadline for appeal de-
stroys judicial finality and makes rule 60(b)(1) a substitute for timely
appeal. The Tenth Circuit also rejected the view that relief is not avail-
able for a fundamental misconception of law after the time for appeal
has expired. 8 This note reviews rule 60(b)(1) as previously applied by
district courts in the Tenth Circuit and discusses the Tenth Circuit's
more liberal approach to the timeliness of rule 60(b)(1) motions.
II. PREVIOUS APPLICATION OF RULE 60(b)(1) WITHIN
THE TENTH CIRCUIT
The Tenth Circuit's approach to rule 60(b)(1) prior to Security Mu-
tual, is articulated by the District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma in Stewart Securities Corp. v. Guaranty Trust Co.. '9 In that
14. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
15. Discussing the effect of a construction which would permit relief beyond time for appeal
in those cases where the motion otherwise meets the reasonableness test, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals concedes that:
Permitting a party to make a Rule 60(b) motion after the time for appeal has run
will indirectly extend the time in which to seek review since the ruling on the motion can
be appealed. However, cases as the present will be unusual. More significantly, allowing
the district court to consider the motion may be more efficient in the long run.
Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 931 (5th Cir. 1976) (citation omitted).
16. See, e.g., 7 J. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 60.22[4] at 268 (2d ed. 1979). "A reason-
able time for relief from an error of law by the court should not exceed the time for an appeal."
Id.
17. Only the Fifth Circuit has allowed relief from a fundamental misconception of law by the
court upon a motion made after the time for appeal has expired. Neither the conservative nor the
moderate view of rule 60(b)(l) allows such relief. See note 2 supra.
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case, Stewart Securities brought a diversity action against Guaranty
Trust for misfeasance in office. Guaranty Trust filed a motion to dis-
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the court sustained the
motion on the basis of an inapplicable case." Stewart Securities did
not appeal, but discovered the error when the Tenth Circuit found ju-
risdiction based on apparently identical facts, in Southwestern Bank &
Trust Co. v. Metcalf State Bank,2 after which Stewart Securities sought
relief pursuant to rule 60(b)(1).
In denying Stewart Security's motion, the district court succinctly
stated its construction of the rule:
Rule 60(b)(1) can be used to correct a judicial mistake.
Though there is some dispute as to whether this encompasses
a fundamental judicial misconception of the law as well as the
inadvertent judicial oversight. . . it is well settled that relief
may not be granted under Rule 60(b)(1) where the error in-
volved is a fundamental misconception of the law and the ap-
peal time has run. 2
The application of incorrect law by the court was a fundamental judi-
cial misconception of the law.23 Under this view the motion must be
made within the time for appeal to be considered as having been made
within a reasonable time. Stewart Securities' motion, not having been
made within the time for appeal, was manifestly untimely and further
consideration of justifiable delay or reasonableness was neither neces-
sary nor available. This reflects the view that while rule 60(b)(1)
should provide relief from judicial mistakes, it should not be available
as a substitute for timely appeal.
III THE APPLICATION OF RULE 60(b)(1) IN SECURITY MUTUAL.
A. The Facts
In Security Mutual,24 Century Casualty Company defended an in-
20. The district court in Stewart Securities sustained a rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
Princiss Lida deals with the problem which arises when two in rem actions are pending, and an
interference issue surfaces. In Stewart Securities, Guaranty Trust had brought a prior in rem
action which was no longer pending and therefore Princess Lida was not applicable. See South-
west Bank & Tr. Co. v. Metcalf St. Bank, 525 F.2d 140,143 (10th Cir. 1975).
21. 525 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1975).
22. 71 F.R.D. 32, 33-34 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (citation omitted).
23. "The court in Southwest Bank & Tr. Co., etc. v. Metcalf St. Bank. .. did not purport to
change the existing law. It merely announced the existing law. Thus, this is not a case of funda-
mental judicial error not appealed from." 71 F.R.D. 32, 34 n.l (W.D. Okla. 1976).
24. 621 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1980).
1980]
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sured, and subsequently claimed reimbursement under its reinsurance
treaty with Security Mutual. 5 Security Mutual brought a declaratory
action seeking determination of its liability to Century and Century
counterclaimed, alleging an antitrust violation.26 The district court
found that Century had failed to give timely notice and that notice was
a condition precedent to Security Mutual's obligation to reimburse.
In reversing the district court, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that notice was not a condition precedent and that Security Mu-
tual's liability should be determined by the terms of the treaty.28 The
district court construed this mandate to allow Security Mutual to pres-
ent evidence of damages caused by failure of the notice covenant and
Century petitioned for a writ of mandamus to prohibit further hearings
relating to the breach. Granting the writ, the court of appeals reas-
serted that its original mandate, calling for liability to be determined by
the terms of the treaty, was intended as a conclusive statement of the
rights of the parties.29
The district court, on March 31, 1977, issued an order directing
entry of judgment and on that same day the clerk entered a judgment
stating that it is "ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment is en-
tered in favor of the Defendant, Century Casualty Company and
against Plaintiff, Security Mutual Casualty Company, and the Compli-
ant and action herein are dismissed, each party to bear its own costs." 30
On April 8th, Security Mutual filed a rule 56 motion for summary
judgment against Century's counterclaim. The district court, on April
11th, denied the motion on the ground of mootness, noting that the
clerk had dismissed the entire case pursuant to court order. Century
filed a rule 60(b) motion for relief on July 14th. The motion was de-
nied and Century appealed.
B. Application of the F#ith Circuit Approach to the Timeliness ofRule
60(b)(1) Motions
Under the moderate view a rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief from a
judgment for reason of a fundamental mistake of law that is filed after
the thirty or sixty day deadline for appeal has run is inherently un-
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timely. Therefore, in order to grant Century's motion under the mod-
erate view it would have been necessary for the court to determine that
the mistake constituted a mere judicial oversight. Instead the Tenth
Circuit court of appeals concluded that "the judgment entered was the
one intended by [the judge]. The question is thus not one of amend-
ment to correct judicial oversight or omission, but of amendment to
correct judicial error."'" Having determined that the mistake consti-
tuted more than mere judicial oversight the moderate view would apply
the thirty day limitation and dismiss the motion.
Instead, the court of appeals cited Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives
Co. ,2 a Fifth Circuit case allowing relief from a fundamental miscon-
ception of law upon a rule 60(b)(1) motion made beyond the time for
appeal.33
The court, following the Fifth Circuit rationale, indicated that re-
lief is available from a fundamental misconception of law upon timely
motion. The court stated "[s]uch relief must. . . be sought... 'within
a reasonable time. . . not more than one year after the judgment'. 34
In discussing what constituted reasonable time the court again cited
Lairsey, where the Fifth Circuit quoted Professors Wright and Miller
in articulating a test for reasonableness:
What constitutes reasonable time must of necessity depend
upon the facts in each individual case. The courts consider
whether the party opposing the motion has been prejudiced
by the delay in seeking relief and they consider whether the
moving party had some good reason for his failure to take
appropriate action sooner.35
This two step determination of reasonableness was then applied in
Security Mutual by the Tenth Circuit. In considering whether the party
opposing the motion had been prejudiced by the delay in seeking relief,
the court found that "no prejudice [was] shown to Security Mutual by
the delay until filing of the Rule 60 motion on July 14. "136 The court,
however, could find no justification for the failure to take appropriate
action in less than the ninety-four day period between the district
court's April 1 th statement, that the entire action had been dismissed,
and Century's July 14th 60(b)(1) motion.
31. Id. at 1067.
32. 542 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1976).
33. 621 F.2d at 1067.
34. Id.
35. 542 F.2d at 930.
36. 621 F.2d at 1067.
1980]
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In Century's favor there are the factors that our mandates cre-
ated confusion and were misread.
• . . Considering all the circumstances and the absence of any
showing of reasons for the delay after the April 11 order until
July 14 when the motion under Rule 60 was fied, we cannot
hold that the motion was timely within the constraints of the
Rule.37
The district court's finding that Century's motion was untimely
and its denial of relief were, for these reasons, affirmed.
C. The Reasoning Behind the Liberal View of Rule 60(b)(1)
Critics of the liberal view assert that the availability of relief be-
yond the thirty or sixty day time for appeal makes rule 60(b)(1) a sub-
stitute for timely appeal. This view, however, applies an artificial and
inflexible limitation that summarily prevents relief for equitable pur-
poses when rule 60(b)(1) is not being used as a substitute for appeal. In
Lairsey, for example, where the fundamental mistake of law involved a
change in decisional law,3" and no basis for appeal existed until the
thirty day time for appeal had expired, a rule 60(b)(1) motion could not
be considered a substitute for timely appeal. The availability of relief
from such a mistake could not offend the policy against allowing par-
ties to purposely choose rule 60(b)(1) as an alternative method of ap-
peal in order to extend the time within which the motion must be made.
The two step "reasonable time" test, requiring that: 1) the delay
not prejudice the party opposing the motion; and 2) the moving party
show good reason for failing to take appropriate action sooner, ade-
quately prevents the use of rule 60(b)(1) as a substitute for appeal while
making its equitable application available. The adequacy of protection
provided by this test is illustrated by its application in Security Mutual.
On two occasions the court of appeals had directed the district court to
determine the amount of Security Mutual's liability to Century. There-
fore it would be unreasonable to expect Century to recognize that the
district court judgment of March 31st dismissed the entire action with-
out determining Security Mutual's liability. Security Mutual's motion
for a summary judgement dismissal of Century's counterclaim makes it
37. Id. at 1067-68.
38. In Lairsey, the district court applied a negligence basis for the liability of the defendant
manufacturer. Five months later the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that Georgia allowed ac-
tions under a strict liability theory. 542 F.2d at 929.
[Vol. 16:347
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apparent that even they did not believe that the entire action had been
disposed of. So long as it as impractical for Century to become aware
of any ground for relief, their delay in seeking that relief should not be
considered as a rejection of appeal as a method of relief in favor of the
extended period available through rule 60(b)(1). Nevertheless, even
where rule 60(b)(1) relief is available beyond the time for appeal, the
motion must be made within a reasonable time after discovery of the
mistake becomes practical. Century's ninety-four day delay in filing its
rule 60(b)(1) motion is repugnant to the policy against extending the
time available for appeal. The reasonable time test adequately pre-
vented the use of rule 60(b)(1) for this purpose and left available the
opportunity to provide relief had it been sought within a reasonable
time.
The concern for judicial finality is adequately served through a
liberal application of rule 60(b)(1). The Fifth Circuit in Lairsey, ad-
dressing the question of judicial finality stated:
Of course, there is an important interest in finality of litiga-
tion. But Rule 60 itself addresses the issue by placing an
outside limit of one year on motions. Presumably it was the
rulemakers' belief that beyond that point the system's need
for finality would prevail, while within that period through
the 'reasonable time' criterion, the interest of finality would be
considered in conjunction with the practical abilities of liti-
gants to become aware of possible grounds for 60(b) relief.39
Circumstances may arise where relief from a fundamental miscon-
ception of law after the deadline for appeal has expired under rule
60(b)(1) will not offend the twin policies sought to be protected. Those
policies are intended to promote finality and preclude the use of rule
60(b)(1) motions as a substitute for appeal. Where those policies are
not offended, relief under rule 60(b)(1) should be as available as it is for
other non-offensive mistakes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in considering Century's mo-
tion for relief from a final judgment for reason of judicial misconcep-
tion of law, adopts the Fifth Circuit's liberal view of rule 60(b)(1) as
applied in Lairsey. Under this view, relief may be had from a judicial
mistake whether it is merely a judicial oversight or a fundamental mis-
39. Id. at 931.
19801
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conception of law. The motion must be made within a reasonable time
and not more than one year after the entry of judgment.
The policy against the use of rule 60(b)(1) as a substitute for timely
dppeal has not been abandoned under the liberal view. Only the appli-
cation of the thirty or sixty day time for appeal limitation has been
discarded. The moving party's justification for delay beyond the time
for appeal will depend on the practical abilities of the litigants to be-
come aware of possible grounds for rule 60(b)(1) relief. This require-
ment adequately prevents the selection of rule 60(b)(1) as an extended
method of appeal while allowing the court to relieve a worthy party
from an erroneous judgment.
Curtis . Frasier
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